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	<title>Comments on: Duke Nukem Forever: Escalating Commitment and Chewing Bubblegum</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.psychologyofgames.com/2009/12/30/duke-nukem-forever-escalating-commitment-and-chewing-bubblegum/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.psychologyofgames.com/2009/12/30/duke-nukem-forever-escalating-commitment-and-chewing-bubblegum/</link>
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		<title>By: Foxnewbee</title>
		<link>http://www.psychologyofgames.com/2009/12/30/duke-nukem-forever-escalating-commitment-and-chewing-bubblegum/comment-page-1/#comment-1193</link>
		<dc:creator>Foxnewbee</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 15 May 2010 22:58:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.psychologyofgames.com/?p=121#comment-1193</guid>
		<description>Excuse me. Does someone understand how to define true   Expert Avisor from bad and a clear     signals from fake? big thanks</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Excuse me. Does someone understand how to define true   Expert Avisor from bad and a clear     signals from fake? big thanks</p>
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		<title>By: sebmojo</title>
		<link>http://www.psychologyofgames.com/2009/12/30/duke-nukem-forever-escalating-commitment-and-chewing-bubblegum/comment-page-1/#comment-608</link>
		<dc:creator>sebmojo</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Mar 2010 21:24:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.psychologyofgames.com/?p=121#comment-608</guid>
		<description>this article is incomplete without the (awesome) chairleg story:  http://hellforge.gameriot.com/blogs/Hellforge/Conspiracy-Theory-Duke-Nukem-Forever-and-a-Story-About-a-Chair</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>this article is incomplete without the (awesome) chairleg story:  <a href="http://hellforge.gameriot.com/blogs/Hellforge/Conspiracy-Theory-Duke-Nukem-Forever-and-a-Story-About-a-Chair" rel="nofollow">http://hellforge.gameriot.com/blogs/Hellforge/Conspiracy-Theory-Duke-Nukem-Forever-and-a-Story-About-a-Chair</a></p>
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		<title>By: Beta ≠ Demo &#171; PSC Gamer</title>
		<link>http://www.psychologyofgames.com/2009/12/30/duke-nukem-forever-escalating-commitment-and-chewing-bubblegum/comment-page-1/#comment-140</link>
		<dc:creator>Beta ≠ Demo &#171; PSC Gamer</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Jan 2010 11:48:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.psychologyofgames.com/?p=121#comment-140</guid>
		<description>[...] more likely to want to buy the game to justify the hours they put into the demo [The proof&#039;s in this article explaining the commitment to Duke Nukem Forever(via Kotaku)]. Which brings me on to my next point, [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] more likely to want to buy the game to justify the hours they put into the demo [The proof&#39;s in this article explaining the commitment to Duke Nukem Forever(via Kotaku)]. Which brings me on to my next point, [...]</p>
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		<title>By: EvilCast Recap, Episode #14 &#124; Games Are Evil: 360, PS3, &#38; Wii Console Gaming Magazine</title>
		<link>http://www.psychologyofgames.com/2009/12/30/duke-nukem-forever-escalating-commitment-and-chewing-bubblegum/comment-page-1/#comment-119</link>
		<dc:creator>EvilCast Recap, Episode #14 &#124; Games Are Evil: 360, PS3, &#38; Wii Console Gaming Magazine</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 10 Jan 2010 08:02:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.psychologyofgames.com/?p=121#comment-119</guid>
		<description>[...] 3. So what took Duke Nuken Forever&#8230; well&#8230; forever?  [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] 3. So what took Duke Nuken Forever&#8230; well&#8230; forever?  [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Duncan</title>
		<link>http://www.psychologyofgames.com/2009/12/30/duke-nukem-forever-escalating-commitment-and-chewing-bubblegum/comment-page-1/#comment-118</link>
		<dc:creator>Duncan</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 10 Jan 2010 05:11:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.psychologyofgames.com/?p=121#comment-118</guid>
		<description>This is exactly how auction/con-trick Swoopo.com works.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is exactly how auction/con-trick Swoopo.com works.</p>
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		<title>By: Jamie Madigan</title>
		<link>http://www.psychologyofgames.com/2009/12/30/duke-nukem-forever-escalating-commitment-and-chewing-bubblegum/comment-page-1/#comment-115</link>
		<dc:creator>Jamie Madigan</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 09 Jan 2010 18:32:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.psychologyofgames.com/?p=121#comment-115</guid>
		<description>Yeah, I assumed there was a lot of different things at play there. I could probably do a whole article on golden handcuffs by itself.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yeah, I assumed there was a lot of different things at play there. I could probably do a whole article on golden handcuffs by itself.</p>
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		<title>By: DNF Worker</title>
		<link>http://www.psychologyofgames.com/2009/12/30/duke-nukem-forever-escalating-commitment-and-chewing-bubblegum/comment-page-1/#comment-113</link>
		<dc:creator>DNF Worker</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 09 Jan 2010 17:04:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.psychologyofgames.com/?p=121#comment-113</guid>
		<description>While escalating commitment is definitely a part of the equation, don&#039;t forget Loss Aversion towards profit-sharing royalty agreements applied to anyone who left the company. &quot;Golden handcuffs&quot; as they like to call them. If you leave, you don&#039;t earn your share, and since so few companies give out royalties the employees who actually appreciate or believe in that kind of thing tend to get double-screwed.

Escalating commitment, Loss aversion, and Sunk Cost Fallacy are a powerful Kool-Aid cocktail against rational behavior.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>While escalating commitment is definitely a part of the equation, don&#8217;t forget Loss Aversion towards profit-sharing royalty agreements applied to anyone who left the company. &#8220;Golden handcuffs&#8221; as they like to call them. If you leave, you don&#8217;t earn your share, and since so few companies give out royalties the employees who actually appreciate or believe in that kind of thing tend to get double-screwed.</p>
<p>Escalating commitment, Loss aversion, and Sunk Cost Fallacy are a powerful Kool-Aid cocktail against rational behavior.</p>
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		<title>By: Jamie Madigan</title>
		<link>http://www.psychologyofgames.com/2009/12/30/duke-nukem-forever-escalating-commitment-and-chewing-bubblegum/comment-page-1/#comment-110</link>
		<dc:creator>Jamie Madigan</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 09 Jan 2010 01:48:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.psychologyofgames.com/?p=121#comment-110</guid>
		<description>I&#039;ll believe it when I see a game on the shelf.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;ll believe it when I see a game on the shelf.</p>
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		<title>By: JZig</title>
		<link>http://www.psychologyofgames.com/2009/12/30/duke-nukem-forever-escalating-commitment-and-chewing-bubblegum/comment-page-1/#comment-108</link>
		<dc:creator>JZig</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 08 Jan 2010 19:27:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.psychologyofgames.com/?p=121#comment-108</guid>
		<description>What JE said directly ties into this. If you officially cancel a game you kill off any expectation of the prior commitments bearing any fruit, and can thus string people along (investors, devs, players) for an apparently infinite amount of time. As long as it isn&#039;t cancelled there&#039;s a chance that it&#039;ll all be worth it!

This kind of delusion is not uncommon in the dev community, trust me.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What JE said directly ties into this. If you officially cancel a game you kill off any expectation of the prior commitments bearing any fruit, and can thus string people along (investors, devs, players) for an apparently infinite amount of time. As long as it isn&#8217;t cancelled there&#8217;s a chance that it&#8217;ll all be worth it!</p>
<p>This kind of delusion is not uncommon in the dev community, trust me.</p>
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		<title>By: Escalation of Commitment &#124; SELECT * FROM shane</title>
		<link>http://www.psychologyofgames.com/2009/12/30/duke-nukem-forever-escalating-commitment-and-chewing-bubblegum/comment-page-1/#comment-94</link>
		<dc:creator>Escalation of Commitment &#124; SELECT * FROM shane</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 01:35:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.psychologyofgames.com/?p=121#comment-94</guid>
		<description>[...] Researchers running this experiment with groups of otherwise rational adults and had final prices go up to ten or even twenty dollars for a one dollar bill. The reason is that bidders escalate their commitment to the auction by citing prior investments as justification for future ones, even though those costs are gone, immutable, and completely out of the picture. Think of it this way: should you invest even one more cent on an auction that will only cause you to lose money even if you “win?” Or is it more rational to just cut your losses and bow out?&#8221; Psychology of Games [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Researchers running this experiment with groups of otherwise rational adults and had final prices go up to ten or even twenty dollars for a one dollar bill. The reason is that bidders escalate their commitment to the auction by citing prior investments as justification for future ones, even though those costs are gone, immutable, and completely out of the picture. Think of it this way: should you invest even one more cent on an auction that will only cause you to lose money even if you “win?” Or is it more rational to just cut your losses and bow out?&#8221; Psychology of Games [...]</p>
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